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Abstract
Even todays most advanced machine learning
models are easily fooled by almost impercepti-
ble perturbations of their inputs. Foolbox is a
new Python package to generate such adversar-
ial perturbations and to quantify and compare
the robustness of machine learning models. It is
build around the idea that the most comparable
robustness measure is the minimum perturbation
needed to craft an adversarial example. To this
end, Foolbox provides reference implementa-
tions of most published adversarial attack meth-
ods alongside some new ones, all of which per-
form internal hyperparameter tuning to find the
minimum adversarial perturbation. Additionally,
Foolbox interfaces with most popular deep learn-
ing frameworks such as PyTorch, Keras, Tensor-
Flow, Theano and MXNet and allows different
adversarial criteria such as targeted misclassifi-
cation and top-k misclassification as well as dif-
ferent distance measures. The code is licensed
under the MIT license and is openly available
at https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox.
The most up-to-date documentation can be found
at http://foolbox.readthedocs.io.
In 2013, Szegedy et al. demonstrated that minimal pertur-
bations, often almost imperceptible to humans, can have
devastating effects on machine predictions. These so-called
adversarial perturbations thus demonstrate a striking dif-
ference between human and machine perception. As a re-
sult, adversarial perturbations have been subject to many
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studies concerning the generation of such perturbations and
strategies to protect machine learning models such as deep
neural networks against them.
A practical definition of the robustness R of a model, first
used by Szegedy et al. (2013), is the average size of the
minimum adversarial perturbation ρ(x) across many sam-
ples x,
R = 〈ρ(x)〉
x
where (1)
ρ(x) = min
δ
d(x,x+ δ) s.t. x+ δ is adversarial (2)
and d(·) is some distance measure.
Unfortunately, finding the global minimum adversarial per-
turbation is close to impossible in any practical setting, and
we thus employ heuristic attacks to find a suitable approx-
imation. Such heuristics, however, can fail, in which case
we could easily be mislead to believe that a model is robust
(Brendel & Bethge, 2017). Our best strategy is thus to em-
ploy as many attacks as possible, and to use the minimal
perturbation found across all attacks as an approximation
to the true global minimum.
At the moment, however, such a strategy is severely ob-
structed by two problems: first, the code for most known
attack methods is either not available at all, or only avail-
able for one particular deep learning framework. Second,
implementations of the same attack often differ in many
details and are thus not directly comparable. Foolbox im-
proves upon the existing Python package cleverhans by
Papernot et al. (2016b) in three important aspects:
1. It interfaces with most popular machine learning
frameworks such as PyTorch, Keras, TensorFlow,
Theano, Lasagne and MXNet and provides a straight
forward way to add support for other frameworks,
2. it provides reference implementations for more than
15 adversarial attacks with a simple and consistent
API, and
3. it supports many different criteria for adversarial ex-
amples, including custom ones.
This technical report is structured as follows: In section
1 we provide an overview over Foolbox and demonstrate
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how to benchmark a model and report the result. In section
2 we describe the adversarial attack methods that are imple-
mented in Foolbox and explain the internal hyperparameter
tuning.
1. Foolbox Overview
1.1. Structure
Crafting adversarial examples requires five elements: first,
a model that takes an input (e.g. an image) and makes a
prediction (e.g. class-probabilities). Second, a criterion
that defines what an adversarial is (e.g. misclassification).
Third, a distance measure that measures the size of a per-
turbation (e.g. L1-norm). Finally, an attack algorithm
that takes an input and its label as well as the model, the
adversarial criterion and the distance measure to generate
an adversarial perturbation.
The structure of Foolbox naturally follows this layout and
implements five Python modules (models, criteria, dis-
tances, attacks, adversarial) summarized below.
Models
foolbox.models
This module implements interfaces to several popular ma-
chine learning libraries:
• TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2016)
foolbox.models.TensorFlowModel
• PyTorch (The PyTorch Developers, 2017)
foolbox.models.PyTorchModel
• Theano (Al-Rfou et al., 2016)
foolbox.models.TheanoModel
• Lasagne (Dieleman et al., 2015)
foolbox.models.LasagneModel
• Keras (any backend) (Chollet, 2015)
foolbox.models.KerasModel
• MXNet (Chen et al., 2015)
foolbox.models.MXNetModel
Each interface is initialized with a framework specific rep-
resentation of the model (e.g. symbolic input and output
tensors in TensorFlow or a neural network module in Py-
Torch). The interface provides the adversarial attack with
a standardized set of methods to compute predictions and
gradients for given inputs. It is straight-forward to imple-
ment interfaces for other frameworks by providingmethods
to calculate predictions and gradients in the specific frame-
work.
Additionally, Foolbox implements a CompositeModel
that combines the predictions of one model with the
gradient of another. This makes it possible to at-
tack non-differentiable models using gradient-based at-
tacks and allows transfer attacks of the type described by
Papernot et al. (2016c).
Criteria
foolbox.criteria
A criterion defines under what circumstances an [input,
label]-pair is considered an adversarial. The following cri-
teria are implemented:
• Misclassification
foolbox.criteria.Misclassification
Defines adversarials as inputs for which the predicted
class is not the original class.
• Top-k Misclassification
foolbox.criteria.TopKMisclassification
Defines adversarials as inputs for which the original
class is not one of the top-k predicted classes.
• Original Class Probability
foolbox.criteria.OriginalClassProbability
Defines adversarials as inputs for which the probabil-
ity of the original class is below a given threshold.
• Targeted Misclassification
foolbox.criteria.TargetClass
Defines adversarials as inputs for which the predicted
class is the given target class.
• Target Class Probability
foolbox.criteria.TargetClassProbability
Defines adversarials as inputs for which the probabil-
ity of a given target class is above a given threshold.
Custom adversarial criteria can be defined and employed.
Some attacks are inherently specific to particular criteria
and thus only work with those.
Distance Measures
foolbox.distances
Distance measures are used to quantify the size of adversar-
ial perturbations. Foolbox implements the two commonly
employed distance measures and can be extended with cus-
tom ones:
• Mean Squared Distance
foolbox.distances.MeanSquaredDistance
Calculates the mean squared error
d(x,y) = 1
N
∑
i(xi − yi)
2
between two vectors x and y.
• Mean Absolute Distance
foolbox.distances.MeanAbsoluteDistance
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Calculates the mean absolute error
d(x,y) = 1
N
∑
i |xi − yi|
between two vectors x and y.
• L∞
foolbox.distances.Linfinity
Calculates the L∞-norm d(x,y) = maxi |xi − yi|
between two vectors x and y.
• L0
foolbox.distances.L0
Calculates the L0-norm d(x,y) =
∑
i 1xi 6=yi be-
tween two vectors x and y.
To achieve invariance to the scale of the input values, we
normalize each element of x,y by the difference between
the smallest and largest allowed value (e.g. 0 and 255).
Attacks
foolbox.attacks
Foolbox implements a large number of adversarial attacks,
see section 2 for an overview. Each attack takes a model
for which adversarials should be found and a criterion that
defines what an adversarial is. The default criterion is mis-
classification. It can then be applied to a reference input to
which the adversarial should be close and the correspond-
ing label. Attacks perform internal hyperparameter tuning
to find the minimum perturbation. As an example, our
implementation of the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
searches for the minimum step-size that turns the input into
an adversarial. As a result there is no need to specify hy-
perparameters for attacks like FGSM. For computational
efficiency, more complex attacks with several hyperparam-
eters only tune some of them.
Adversarial
foolbox.adversarial
An instance of the adversarial class encapsulates all infor-
mation about an adversarial, including which model, crite-
rion and distance measure was used to find it, the original
unperturbed input and its label or the size of the smallest
adversarial perturbation found by the attack.
An adversarial object is automatically created whenever an
attack is applied to an [input, label]-pair. By default, only
the actual adversarial input is returned. Calling the attack
with unpack set to False returns the full object instead.
Such an adversarial object can then be passed to an ad-
versarial attack instead of the [input, label]-pair, enabling
advanced use cases such as pausing and resuming long-
running attacks.
1.2. Reporting Benchmark Results
When reporting benchmark results generated with Foolbox
the following information should be stated:
• the version number of Foolbox,
• the set of input samples,
• the set of attacks applied to the inputs,
• any non-default hyperparameter setting,
• the criterion and
• the distance metric.
1.3. Versioning System
Each release of Foolbox is tagged with a version number of
the type MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH that follows the princi-
ples of semantic versioning1 with some additional precau-
tions for comparable benchmarking. We increment the
1. MAJOR version when we make changes to the API
that break compatibility with previous versions.
2. MINOR version when we add functionality or make
backwards compatible changes that can affect the
benchmark results.
3. PATCH version when we make backwards compatible
bug fixes that do not affect benchmark results.
Thus, to compare the robustness of two models it is impor-
tant to use the same MAJOR.MINOR version of Foolbox.
Accordingly, the version number of Foolbox should always
be reported alongside the benchmark results, see section
1.2.
2. Implemented Attack Methods
We here give a short overview over each attack method im-
plemented in Foolbox, referring the reader to the original
references for more details. We use the following notation:
x a model input
ℓ a class label
x0 reference input
ℓ0 reference label
L(x, ℓ) loss (e.g. cross-entropy)
[bmin, bmax] input bounds (e.g. 0 and 255)
2.1. Gradient-Based Attacks
Gradient-based attacks linearize the loss (e.g. cross-
entropy) around an input x to find directions ρ to which
the model predictions for class ℓ are most sensitive to,
L(x+ ρ, ℓ) ≈ L(x, ℓ) + ρ⊤∇xL(x, ℓ). (3)
Here ∇xL(x, ℓ) is referred to as the gradient of the loss
w.r.t. the input x.
1
http://semver.org/
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Gradient Attack
foolbox.attacks.GradientAttack
This attack computes the gradient g(x0) = ∇xL(x0, ℓ0)
once and then seeks the minimum step size ǫ such that x0+
ǫg(x0) is adversarial.
Gradient Sign Attack (FGSM)
foolbox.attacks.GradientSignAttack
foolbox.attacks.FGSM
This attack computes the gradient g(x0) = ∇xL(x0, ℓ0)
once and then seeks the minimum step size ǫ such that x0+
ǫ sign(g(x0)) is adversarial (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Iterative Gradient Attack
foolbox.attacks.IterativeGradientAttack
Iterative gradient ascent seeks adversarial perturbations by
maximizing the loss along small steps in the gradient di-
rection g(x) = ∇xL(x, ℓ0), i.e. the algorithm iteratively
updates xk+1 ← xk + ǫg(xk). The step-size ǫ is tuned
internally to find the minimum perturbation.
Iterative Gradient Sign Attack
foolbox.attacks.IterativeGradientSignAttack
Similar to iterative gradient ascent, this attack seeks
adversarial perturbations by maximizing the loss along
small steps in the ascent direction sign(g(x)) =
sign (∇xL(x, ℓ0)), i.e. the algorithm iteratively updates
xk+1 ← xk + ǫ sign(g(xk)). The step-size ǫ is tuned in-
ternally to find the minimum perturbation.
DeepFool L2 Attack
foolbox.attacks.DeepFoolL2Attack
In each iteration DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015)
computes for each class ℓ 6= ℓ0 the minimum distance
d(ℓ, ℓ0) that it takes to reach the class boundary by approx-
imating the model classifier with a linear classifier. It then
makes a corresponding step in the direction of the class
with the smallest distance.
DeepFool L∞ Attack
foolbox.attacks.DeepFoolLinfinityAttack
Like the DeepFool L2 Attack, but minimizes the L∞-norm
instead.
L-BFGS Attack
foolbox.attacks.LBFGSAttack
L-BFGS-B is a second-order optimiser that we here use to
find the minimum of
L(x+ ρ, ℓ) + λ ‖ρ‖
2
2
s.t. xi + ρi ∈ [bmin, bmax]
where ℓ 6= ℓ0 is the target class (Szegedy et al., 2013). A
line-search is performed over the regularisation parameter
λ > 0 to find the minimum adversarial perturbation. If the
target class is not specified we choose ℓ as the class of the
adversarial example generated by the gradient attack.
SLSQP Attack
foolbox.attacks.SLSQPAttack
Compared to L-BFGS-B, SLSQP allows to additionally
specify non-linear constraints. This enables us to skip the
line-search and to directly optimise
‖ρ‖
2
2
s.t. L(x+ ρ, ℓ) = l ∧ xi + ρi ∈ [bmin, bmax]
where ℓ 6= ℓ0 is the target class. If the target class is not
specified we choose ℓ as the class of the adversarial exam-
ple generated by the gradient attack.
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack
foolbox.attacks.SaliencyMapAttack
This targeted attack (Papernot et al., 2016a) uses the gradi-
ent to compute a saliency score for each input feature (e.g.
pixel). This saliency score reflects how strongly each fea-
ture can push the model classification from the reference to
the target class. This process is iterated, and in each iter-
ation only the feature with the maximum saliency score is
perturbed.
2.2. Score-Based Attacks
Score-based attacks do not require gradients of the model,
but they expect meaningful scores such as probabilites or
logits which can be used to approximate gradients.
Single Pixel Attack
foolbox.attacks.SinglePixelAttack
This attack (Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016) probes
the robustness of a model to changes of single pixels by set-
ting a single pixel to white or black. It repeats this process
for every pixel in the image.
Local Search Attack
foolbox.attacks.LocalSearchAttack
This attack (Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2016) mea-
sures the model’s sensitivity to individual pixels by apply-
ing extreme perturbations and observing the effect on the
probability of the correct class. It then perturbs the pixels
to which the model is most sensitive. It repeats this process
until the image is adversarial, searching for additional crit-
ical pixels in the neighborhood of previously found ones.
Approximate L-BFGS Attack
foolbox.attacks.ApproximateLBFGSAttack
Same as L-BFGS except that gradients are computed nu-
merically. Note that this attack is only suitable if the input
dimensionality is small.
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2.3. Decision-Based Attacks
Decision-based attacks rely only on the class decision of
the model. They do not require gradients or probabilities.
Boundary Attack
foolbox.attacks.BoundaryAttack
Foolbox provides the reference implementation for the
Boundary Attack (Brendel et al., 2018). The Boundary At-
tack is the most effective decision-based adversarial attack
to minimize the L2-norm of adversarial perturbations. It
finds adversarial perturbations as small as the best gradient-
based attacks without relying on gradients or probabilities.
Pointwise Attack
foolbox.attacks.PointwiseAttack
Foolbox provides the reference implementation for the
Pointwise Attack. The Pointwise Attack is the most ef-
fective decision-based adversarial attack to minimize the
L0-norm of adversarial perturbations.
Additive Uniform Noise Attack
foolbox.attacks.AdditiveUniformNoiseAttack
This attack probes the robustness of a model to i.i.d. uni-
form noise. A line-search is performed internally to find
minimal adversarial perturbations.
Additive Gaussian Noise Attack
foolbox.attacks.AdditiveGaussianNoiseAttack
This attack probes the robustness of a model to i.i.d. normal
noise. A line-search is performed internally to findminimal
adversarial perturbations.
Salt and Pepper Noise Attack
foolbox.attacks.SaltAndPepperNoiseAttack
This attack probes the robustness of a model to i.i.d. salt-
and-pepper noise. A line-search is performed internally to
find minimal adversarial perturbations.
Contrast Reduction Attack
foolbox.attacks.ContrastReductionAttack
This attack probes the robustness of a model to contrast re-
duction. A line-search is performed internally to find min-
imal adversarial perturbations.
Gaussian Blur Attack
foolbox.attacks.GaussianBlurAttack
This attack probes the robustness of a model to Gaussian
blur. A line-search is performed internally to find minimal
blur needed to turn the image into an adversarial.
Precomputed Images Attack
foolbox.attacks.PrecomputedImagesAttack
Special attack that is initialized with a set of expected input
images and corresponding adversarial candidates. When
applied to an image, it tests the models robustness to the
precomputed adversarial candidate corresponding to the
given image. This can be useful to test a models robust-
ness against image perturbations created using an external
method.
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